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7th October 2019 by foodfraudadvisors

Latest news in food fraud

US beef sellers behaving badly and new information about lead in turmeric

In September 2019, four men from the United States beef industry were accused of food fraud by authorities. The men were owners and executives at two unrelated companies; one a beef wholesale company in New York, the other a Texan supplier to the US government.

Why would any person perpetrate food fraud? It is alleged that the New York men were struggling to make a profit in their business, even going so far as to successfully audition for a business makeoever reality TV show. They are alleged to have systematically removed United States Department of Agriculture-approved meat quality labels from cuts of beef and replaced them with counterfeit labels of a higher grade, enabling them to sell the beef at a higher price.

The men in Texas, who plead guilty for their role in a scheme to illegally add cow hearts to ground beef and who admitted to hiding the cow hearts from government inspectors, were almost certainly doing it for the money. The courts have heard that they sold the more than $1m worth of the adulterated meat to the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

In both of these cases, the frauds resulted in customers receiving food that was not true to label, and those customers proceeded to unknowingly sell and serve it to un-suspecting consumers. In one case, the meat was mislabelled but not physically modified, in the other case, the meat itself was adulterated with unauthorised material. When food is adulterated or otherwise modified, processed or (re-)packed in a fraudulent manner, the result is a product that can present significant food safety risks to consumers.

Texan meat processors have pleaded guilty to adding beef heart to $1m of ground beef.

 

Food fraud perpetrators generally wish to avoid causing serious or obvious food safety issues; after all, they do not want to be caught.  As a result, not all food frauds result in food safety incidents.  In a terrifying exception to this rule, however, it was alleged that a group of at least five people who adulterated black pepper in Vietnam in 2018 were aware that the adulterants were toxic.  The weight of the pepper was fraudulently increased by the addition of home-dyed gravel and coffee bean skins.  The dye was made by breaking open batteries to extract black-coloured manganese dioxide powder.

Another example of a toxic adulterant and one that has caused widespread illness and suffering is the industrial chemical melamine.  Melamine, which contains nitrogen atoms, can be used to trick some protein test methods which calculate protein content of food based on nitrogen within the food.   Melamine adulteration can therefore be used to boost the apparent protein content of foods such as milk powder, that are priced according to their protein content. Three hundred thousand babies became ill after drinking milk adulterated with melamine in China in 2008.  Six babies died and tens of thousands of other infants, who are now teenagers, received irreversible kidney damage, condemning them to a life of renal dialysis and ongoing surgeries.

Melamine has also been used to fraudulently adulterate wheat products, meat products and animal feed.  In the United States, melamine adulteration of dog and cat food caused the deaths of up to 3600 pets in 2007.

One of the scariest food safety issues to arise in connection with food fraud in recent years affects a food product favoured by some wealthy western consumers for its health-giving properties.  Turmeric has been lauded as a wonder-food; with properties that are said to cure joint pain, reduce inflammation, improve mood, brain function and protect against heart disease.  But powdered turmeric also presents real food safety risks to consumers because a significant proportion of powdered turmeric traded worldwide contains unsafe levels of lead.  Lead is a potent neurotoxin that damages organs including the brain.  Research released in September 2019 confirmed that the lead in turmeric is added to the spice in the form of toxic lead chromate which has a beautiful, intense yellow colour, the exact colour favoured by turmeric traders and buyers as an indicator of freshness and quality.  Curry powder, cumin and cinnamon have also been affected.  Another 2019 study, which surveyed more than 1496 samples of 50 spices from 41 countries found that 50% of the spice samples had detectable lead, and more than 30% had lead concentrations greater than 2 ppm, a level 200 times higher than the recommended maximum lead content of candy in the USA.

While not all food fraud represents a risk to food safety, fraudsters who adulterate food to make extra money for themselves put consumers lives at risk.  Stay up to date with new food fraud incidents on our free, open-access food fraud database.

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Filed Under: Food Fraud

29th September 2019 by foodfraudadvisors

Authenticity testing – recommended frequency

Part 3 in our series about food fraud testing

Part 1: Food testing checklist

Part 2: How to design a food testing plan

Guidance on test frequencies:

When developing a food fraud testing plan, one of the biggest challenges is choosing the frequency of testing.  Food Fraud Advisors has developed these guidelines to use as a starting point.   They are not a definitive guide, always follow the advice of your analytical laboratory and specialists.

For any given material, the frequency of testing should be based on its susceptibility to food fraud.  Suggestions for five different types of materials (A, B, C, D) are described below. Test frequencies should be reviewed and adjusted on a regular basis. Frequencies can be decreased if results are consistently acceptable and increased if problems have occurred or if there are changes to the product or the supply chain.

Type A: a material known to be very susceptible to food fraud (eg. honey, white fish fillets) but for which no specific incidences have occurred within your supply chain and for which no intelligence related to your supply chain has been received.

Phase 1: test a sample from 5 out of 5 incoming batches from every supplier and/or geographical source. For agricultural materials, this sampling protocol should be repeated on a seasonal basis across the year. The aim is to build a picture of authenticity across the year for your suppliers. Progress to phase 2 if all the results from phase 1 have been satisfactory. If test results have revealed problems with authenticity, phase 1 should continue for the affected suppliers or places of origin. Suppliers with satisfactory results can progress to phase 2.

Phase 2: reduce the frequency of testing to one sample per 5 to 10 incoming batches, with the frequency based on your estimate of the ongoing risk. As in phase 1, materials with seasonal supply fluctuations should be tested over various seasons. Use the results from phase 2 to continue to add to the overall picture of authenticity for this material type within your supply chain. Continue until you have at least 10 results. Progress to phase 3 if all results are satisfactory.

Phase 3: is an ongoing maintenance phase. Aim to test one sample per 10 to 20 incoming batches as an ongoing protocol.

Type B: Material for which you have received specific intelligence related to authenticity that pertains to your supply chain.

Phase 1: focussing on the implicated products or ingredients, take samples from at least 5 incoming batches. If the material is non-homogenous – for example if it is in individual packages, or individual pieces rather than being a bulk liquid or powder – consider taking duplicate or triplicate samples from each incoming batch, if budget allows. If all of these samples ‘pass’ the tests, consider trying alternative test methods or test types. Move to phase 2 if all test results are satisfactory.

Phase 2: reduce the frequency of testing to one sample per 5 incoming batches. Continue this frequency of testing until your intelligence information and your test results are sufficient to suggest that the risks within your supply chain have passed. If the risk has abated, reduce the frequency to that of phase 3 for type A.

Type C: Moderately susceptible materials

Phase 1: test a sample from 1 of 5 to 10 incoming batches from every supplier and/or geographical source. For agricultural materials, this sampling protocol should be repeated on a seasonal basis across the year. The aim is to build a picture of authenticity across the year.  Continue until you have at least 5 results per supplier or geographical source. Progress to phase 2 if all the results from phase 1 have been satisfactory. If test results have revealed problems with authenticity, phase 1 should continue for the affected suppliers or places of origin. Suppliers with satisfactory results can progress to phase 2.

Phase 2: test one sample per 10 to 20 incoming batches with the frequency based on your estimate of risk. As in phase 1, materials with seasonal supply fluctuations should be tested over various seasons. Use the results from phase 2 to continue to add to the overall picture of authenticity for this material type. Continue until you have 5 results. Progress to phase 3 if all results are satisfactory.

Phase 3: If all results from phases 1 and 2 are satisfactory, the frequency of testing can be significantly reduced. One test per year per supplier should be adequate for most materials and suppliers.

Type D: Food products at risk of counterfeiting or suspected of being from illegitimate sources

A market surveillance sampling plan should be devised. Retail and/or wholesale sources in high risk markets should be targeted in addition to online marketplaces. Anonymous market ‘buyers’ could be engaged to obtain the samples. Buyers can be instructed to purchase a specific number of items per batch per outlet, or they can be instructed to inspect or photograph samples in situ. The amount of surveillance will depend on the brand owner’s tolerance of counterfeiting and the testing budget.  Products at high risk of counterfeiting are likely to need ongoing surveillance.  Food products that have been found to have entered marketplaces through theft, diversion or grey market channels can have their risk reduced by implementing controls within distribution chains.

Type E: low risk materials. If a food ingredient or product has been shown to be low risk in a food fraud vulnerability assessment then authenticity testing should not be required. If the material or supply chain has changed such that the material requires authenticity testing then its food fraud vulnerability should be re-classified to medium or high risk.

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Filed Under: Food Fraud, Learn

21st April 2019 by foodfraudadvisors

Secrets of the horsemeat scandal

How did the enactment of an obscure transport law in Eastern Europe change the face of food manufacturing forever?  Karen Constable investigates the link between Romanian road rules and the horsemeat scandal.

More than six years after it first made headlines, the series of incidents that became known ‘horsegate’ continues to impact the global food industry.  It began in January 2013, when Irish authorities revealed they had discovered horsemeat in burgers that were supposed to contain 100% beef.  The discovery sparked a frenzy of testing and soon horsemeat was being discovered in dozens of different products in countries all over Europe and beyond.  The sheer scale of the contamination sent shock waves through the food manufacturing world.  Occurring five years after the melamine in milk powder scandal of 2008, which sickened over 300,000 babies in China, this incident was unfolding much closer to home for food manufacturers in Europe.  It was a wakeup call for our industry: we could no longer pretend that food fraud of a similar scale and impact as the melamine milk scandal could not happen in the western world.

Numerous massive recalls

The scandal resulted in market withdrawals of tens of millions of food products across Europe, millions of euros of lost business and multiple prosecutions.  Consumers’ trust in manufactured food plummeted and sales of frozen hamburgers and frozen ready meals dropped by 43% and 13% respectively in the United Kingdom in the month following the first product withdrawal.

Multiple investigations

Despite some media reports claiming that the first horsemeat discovery was the result of ‘routine’ testing, it is now known that the scandal was uncovered almost by accident.  As strange as it may seem to the wider community, it is unusual for food manufacturers and regulatory authorities to test foods for materials that are not expected to be present.  This is, of course, how the perpetrators of the Chinese melamine fraud could conduct their activities on such a large scale for what is thought to be a significant length of time.  The original horsemeat tests were conducted by the Food Safety Authority of Ireland because a sharp-eyed inspector had noticed a discrepancy between packaging and labelling of frozen meat.

As the investigations began it became apparent that law enforcement and regulatory authorities were ill-equipped to manage the complex cross-border issues that arose.  Supply chains seemed hopelessly complicated to unravel, with on-paper ownership of meat often disconnected from the physical whereabouts of the food.  By the time the scandal was declared over, investigators had identified at least three entirely separate supply chains involving different slaughterhouses, traders, processors and criminals.

Beef an easy target

Horsemeat and beef meat are similar in appearance, texture and flavour.  Yet the European market for horsemeat is relatively small compared with beef; it is not consumed by people in many Western European cultures. For unscrupulous merchants, however, horsemeat’s abundance and low price made it the perfect substitute for beef.   With access to a cheap, abundant adulterant, the criminals appeared to have an easy job of it.  It was so easy, in fact, that swapping horse for beef appears to have been a long-term business plan for at least one of the meat traders involved in the scandal, Jan Fasen.  Fasen had been convicted and jailed for a similar fraud in 2007.  The name of his company, Draap, is the Dutch word for horse spelt backwards.

In 2019, Fasen and his partner Hendricus Windmeijer were convicted of false labelling by a court in Paris for their role in the supply of 500 tons of meat to ready-to-eat meal-maker Comigel in France in 2012 and 2013.

Complex supply chains

Much of the horsemeat found in the affected products originated in Romania, the by-product of a unique set of circumstances which affected the availability and price of horse meat in that country.  Six years prior to the scandal, a law had been passed banning horse drawn vehicles from the streets of cities and towns in Romania.  Within a few years there was a surplus of unwanted horses, with abandoned animals roaming city streets and parks.  The horses were rounded up and exported to slaughterhouses in neighbouring countries where they were slaughtered for legitimate human and pet food.  By 2007, however, concerns about the spread of equine infectious anaemia, a disease which was endemic in Romania, resulted in a ban on the trading of live Romanian horses.  With live exports stopped, there was nowhere for the horses to go.  Enterprising local businessmen built their own slaughterhouses in Romania and began to export horse meat to Europe.

Draap Trading, a company operated from Belgium and registered in Cyprus, was among those that purchased Romanian horsemeat.  It shipped the meat to the Netherlands where it was re-labelled as beef.  From there it was sold to legitimate meat processors, including one in France who supplied the factory in Luxembourg that manufactured lasagne and spaghetti bolognese for Findus and Aldi.

Separately, a French meat processing company, À la Table de Spanghero was also purchasing horsemeat from Romania and selling it to food manufacturers labelled as beef.  The former director and manager of Spanghero were convicted for their crimes in Paris in April 2019, with the former director being jailed for his role in the saga.

Romania was not the only source, however: the burgers at the centre of the initial discovery in Ireland contained horsemeat that came not from Romania but from Britain, Germany and Poland, via another Dutch trader, Willy Selten.  In 2015 Selten was jailed for 2.5 years for crimes related to the fraudulent supply of horsemeat in 2011 and 2012.  In November 2016 he was ordered to pay €1.2m – the estimated proceeds of his crimes – to the Dutch government.

A long history of horsemeat adulteration?

Given the history of Selten and Fasen, it seems likely that undeclared horse was present in the European food supply for many years, remaining undetected and causing no apparent harm to consumers.  We will never know whether those responsible considered the safety of consumers when planning their crimes.  We do know that unsafe adulterants are more likely to be detected, which makes them less attractive to fraudsters.  Certainly, in the melamine scandal in China, just a few years prior, consumer harm played an important role in the detection of the fraud.  In that case, it is likely that low levels of melamine had been added to milk powder and other products for many months or years without causing any immediate or obvious harm to anyone.  It is thought that the concentration of melamine in baby formula increased in 2007 and 2008 and it was the higher levels that caused kidney problems in babies.  The fraud was uncovered by authorities investigating the illnesses.  Perhaps the extra melamine had been added by mistake, or perhaps the fraudsters got greedy.  Either way, the adulteration was costly for the criminals as well as their victims: two of the people responsible were executed by firing squad in China in 2009.

During the horsemeat fiasco, and to the relief of the entire industry, no person was sickened or injured by the presence of horse in ‘beef’ products.  There was, however, a major health scare: horsemeat can contain veterinary drugs, including phenylbutazone – “bute”, which can be harmful to human health.  It was a lucky coincidence that the overwhelming majority of the contaminated products proved not to contain phenylbutazone.

From horse and beef to chicken, donkey and buffalo

As investigators worked behind the scenes, public events in the European food industry took on the appearance of collapsing dominoes: first was the withdrawal of 10 million burgers by Tesco, Lidl, Aldi, Dunnes Stores and Iceland in United Kingdom.  Tesco lost £300m in market value overnight.  In the following weeks, Asda also removed tens of thousands of products from its shelves; Tesco and Aldi extended their withdrawal from burgers to ready meals; Waitrose withdrew meatballs because of fears they might contain pork; slaughterhouses in Yorkshire and Wales were raided by regulatory authorities; the scandal spread to France and multiple arrests were made on both sides of the English Channel.

By the end of March 2013, authorities had found horse labelled as beef in three Polish factories; equine DNA had been found in chicken nuggets in Greece; water buffalo and donkey had been found in South African burgers and more big brands, including Ikea, Birdseye and Nestle had been affected with their products withdrawn from markets in Cyprus, Belgium, Spain and Czech Republic.

By year’s end, Tesco’s annual profits had fallen by 52%.  Consumer trust in large food manufacturers and retailers was at an all-time low: British consumer organisation ‘Which?’ reported that sixty percent of consumers had changed their shopping habits because of the scandal.

Standards updated

The British government commissioned Professor Chris Elliott to review and report on the implications of the horsemeat contamination for the British food industry.  The Elliott review, as it became known, resulted in the creation of a special food fraud crime unit in that country and the development of a range of other collaborative enterprises across Europe including special functions within the European Joint Research Council (JRC) and food-focussed operations by Interpol known as Operation Opson, now in its sixth year.

The food safety community, initially shocked and alarmed at the potential safety implications of the adulteration soon began a period of discussion and introspection, which often centred around the unspoken question ‘What if the meat had been dangerous?’.  The scandal broke at a time when the GFSI food safety standards were consolidating their revered positions at the pinnacle of ‘best practice’ manufacturing: the standards were being strengthened, lengthened and broadened.  Audit durations were increasing, auditor qualifications and certification systems had become more stringent and standards for packaging, storage and distribution had been upgraded.  And yet these GFSI-endorsed food safety management systems, considered to be the gold-standard for food manufacturing and administered with the strictest oversight, had revealed an Achilles heel the size of Bucharest.   The GFSI promptly created the ‘Food Fraud Think Tank’ to address the gaps and suggest solutions.  This resulted in changes to GFSI’s guidance for food safety standards, with GFSI-endorsed standards being updated to reflect the updated guidance.  The new guidance requires food businesses to formally address the risks from fraudulently adulterated ingredients when they design their food safety management systems.

The food safety landscape had changed, seemingly overnight, from one that was focussed almost exclusively on unintentional or natural contamination to one that requires food manufacturers to consider, control and prevent more unpredictable and sinister events.

In the wake of these changes, a new discipline of food study has appeared.  It is now possible to study food fraud at prestigious educational institutions, attend international conferences devoted to the topic and tune in to webinars conducted by specialists in compliance, legislation and testing.  Analytical chemistry researchers are developing ever-more sophisticated test methods for detecting adulterants.  Food businesses large and small are developing better systems to prevent, deter and detect economically motivated adulteration within their supply chains.

Food manufacturers are slowly regaining the trust of consumers, helped by the visible presence of enforcement operations and government initiatives such as the United Kingdom’s Food Crime Unit and Interpol’s Operation Opson in Europe as well as the Food Safety Modernisation Act (FSMA) in the United States.

And what of the adulterated beef?  We can only guess at how many tonnes of it was eaten by unsuspecting consumers in countries all over Europe before the scandal broke.  Contaminated product that was withdrawn from the market – tens of millions of units – was destroyed; either buried in landfill or used as animal feed.  It seems a sad and wasteful journey for the unwanted horses of Romania; a journey conceived by men who wanted to be rich and one that ultimately changed the face of food manufacturing forever.

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Filed Under: Adulteration, Food Fraud, Food Safety, Impact of Food Fraud, Supply Chain, Traceability

16th March 2019 by Karen Constable

How food fraud is uncovered; two cases of origin fraud

Origin fraud occurs when a food is misrepresented with respect to its geographical origin; it’s a type of fraud that can be categorised as ‘mislabeling’.

Examples of mislabeling include:

  • describing a fruit or vegetable as ‘organic’ when it was conventionally grown
  • cheeses and meats labeled as kosher or halal that are not
  • Spanish olive oil falsely declared as being ‘Italian’.  This is origin fraud.

Mislabeling is also called misbranding in some countries.  Because it is intended to deceive customers and consumers it is illegal under consumer protection laws and trade/contract laws just about everywhere.  Because almost every type of food fraud involves mislabeling to some extent, quoting statistics on mislabeling is difficult.  As an example, a botanical supplement labelled as 100% turmeric extract but that actually contains 15% filler is both mislabeled and diluted.  To make it even trickier, different organisations using different words to describe similar food fraud activities.  Learn more about classifying food fraud types in this great Food Safety Tech Article.  Suffice to say, mislabeling fraud is very common and, according to US Grocery Manufacturers Association, it affects around 10% of food products globally.

Coffee growers in Hawaii have launched a class action to protect their products

How do we expose origin fraud?  Typically, origin fraud is uncovered after authorities have been tipped off about suspect activity in a supply chain, either by people from within the supply chain or by competitors of the mislabeled product.   The evidence used to pursue the fraudsters often comes from either fraudulent documentation, or from testing of finished products.  This year we have seen an increase in the use of authenticity testing by representatives of ‘authentic’ brands to expose fraudulent products.  This is a trend that I expect to continue as test methods are improved, refined and can more easily be extended to assess specific product attributes.

I have been following this trend with interest and was reading, today, about alleged origin fraud in coffee in the United States. This is a case that is representative of the trend to use sophisticated test methods to authenticate finished product attributes.  Another recent example would be honey testing in Australia.  In the coffee case, growers from the Kona district of Hawaii have filed a lawsuit against retailers for allegedly selling ‘Kona’ coffee that does not contain a reasonable amount of coffee from the district. Kona coffee production is 2.7 million pounds, however more than 20 million pounds of coffee labelled ‘Kona’ is sold each year.  The plaintiffs claim to have analytical test results to support their claims.  Nineteen brands of coffee, sold by retailers including Walmart, Cosco and Amazon, have been named in the complaint.  Chemical testing technology underpins this current lawsuit, as it allows the coffee growers to show, for the first time, the actual Kona content of the coffee that is being allegedly mislabeled.  For this to be possible, the coffee growers would have had to organise for testing laboratories to create a database of chemical test results of authentic samples of Kona coffee.  Databases like this are used to model a product’s unique chemical fingerprint using sophisticated mathematical computations.  The test method can then be used to compare the ‘fingerprints’ of suspect brands against those of authentic products, such as Kona-grown coffee, and infer the amount of genuine material in each sample.  Developing databases for this type of testing is expensive and time consuming.  However, there are an increasing number of laboratories that have the machinery, skills and software to perform this work, so it is becoming more accessible to brand owners.

Specialty vinegars fetch high prices and can be vulnerable to economically motivated food fraud.

In cases that do not originate with product testing, it is activities in the supply chain that provide clues to origin fraud.  This month there have been reports of origin fraud for a specialty vinegar, Modena balsamic vinegar.  Modena balsamic is protected by a special geographical designation under European regulations.  According to these rules, Modena balsamic vinegar must be produced using grapes only from certain regions in order to be considered authentically ‘Modena’.  A massive fraud involving 15 million Euros worth of materials has been uncovered in Italy after a special operation by local authorities found that the wrong grapes were being used to produce this very expensive product.  Although operational details about this investigation are scarce, these types of actions by authorities are often initiated after authorities have received a tip off from someone connected with the supply chain.   Another example of such a tip-off includes this recent wine counterfeiting operation in which authorities became aware that a printing shop had received an order for 4,500 wine labels from a company that was not the brand owner.

More tip-offs and more testing are my predictions for 2019 and 2020.  These are going to lead to more investigations, complaints and enforcement actions against perpetrators of food fraud.  And that’s a win for everyone!

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Filed Under: Food Fraud

13th January 2019 by foodfraudadvisors

From the food fraud desk

Happy New Year!

Last year was a busy year for Food Fraud Advisors.

Detection and enforcement actions increasing

Food fraud remains a hot topic in the food industry and is garnering stronger interest from the international anti-counterfeiting industry as well as international crime prevention groups like Europol and Interpol.  Recently, the international media have been discussing the role of organised crime syndicates in the food industry, particularly in the produce sector in Italy and in tuna trading in Europe.

Detections of food fraud and seizures have increased: almost a quarter of the 31 m counterfeit items seized by EU customs agents in 2017 were food stuffs.

In 2018 we were pleased to witness a number of serious law enforcement actions across the globe.  This is a trend which I hope will continue.  As an example, the people responsible for a long-running, fraudulent organic grain scheme in the USA were charged and pleaded guilty.  In Pakistan, the authorities have used new laws prohibiting the sale of unpackaged spices, which were created to reduce food adulteration, to seize 165,000 kg of spices and shut down 400 spice processing facilities.

Rising consumer awareness

Meanwhile, consumer awareness of food fraud is also rising.  Nearly three quarters of UK consumers think there is a serious problem with food fraud in their country and one quarter of consumers think they have experienced it first hand.

food fraud worries shoppers

Test method developments

In academia, new test methods for food fraud detection continue to be created and refined.  As exciting as it is to read headlines in journals about the latest scientific breakthrough, many of the research papers report on testing methodology that won’t be ready to be used by food manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers for some time.  One such exciting headline recently gushed that scientists have found a new ‘simple’ method to distinguish organic milk from conventional milk.   The headline did indeed to turn out to be too good to be true, with more work on a larger sample size needed to validate the method.   However, with organic products at very high risk of food fraud and detection being difficult, it’s great to see the analytical community working on these problems.

Our year working for you

Within Food Fraud Advisors we have been focussing on keeping up to date with our customers’ needs for the latest versions of SQF, BRC and IFS food safety standards.  Food fraud documentation is one of the top sources of non-conformities in food safety audits so many of our customers have been seeking help to boost their programs.

SQF’s standard in particular caused a few headaches for our clients.  SQFI did not publish any guidance for food fraud until after the implementation date for Edition 8.  As a result, many SQF-certified facilities needed our help to understand and implement programs to meet the new food fraud requirements before their first audits.  Within the  SQF guidance document there is a recommendation for senior managers to be trained in food fraud awareness and we were pleased to launch a short, practical on-demand training course to meet this requirement.   We’ve had great feedback about this course, and for only $59 it’s a great way to meet your continuous improvement and training requirements for 2019.

Also in 2018, our one-stop, deep-dive food fraud training course was re-launched, with new lessons, more downloadable templates, new content for food fraud teams and step-by-step instructions for creating and implementing a food fraud prevention program from scratch.   Check it out today. 

We look forward to working with you in 2019 and beyond.

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Filed Under: Food Fraud

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